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Here we summarize 108 reported whale-vessel collisions in Alaska from 1978–2011, of which 25 are known to have resulted in
the whale’s death. We found 89 definite and 19 possible/probable strikes based on standard criteria we created for this study. Most
strikes involved humpback whales (86%) with six other species documented. Small vessel strikes were most common (<15 m,
60%), but medium (15–79 m, 27%) and large (≥80 m, 13%) vessels also struck whales. Among the 25 mortalities, vessel length
was known in seven cases (190–294 m) and vessel speed was known in three cases (12–19 kn). In 36 cases, human injury or property
damage resulted from the collision, and at least 15 people were thrown into the water. In 15 cases humpback whales struck anchored
or drifting vessels, suggesting the whales did not detect the vessels. Documenting collisions in Alaska will remain challenging due
to remoteness and resource limitations. For a better understanding of the factors contributing to lethal collisions, we recommend
(1) systematic documentation of collisions, including vessel size and speed; (2) greater efforts to necropsy stranded whales; (3)
using experienced teams focused on determining cause of death; (4) using standard criteria for validating collision reports, such
as those presented in this paper.
1. Introduction
Ship strikes are a source of injury and mortality for whales
worldwide but documenting these events and their outcomes
is a significant challenge. The rate at which whale-vessel
collisions occur, the types of vessels involved, and the extent
to which they affect particular populations of whales are
largely unknown, especially in remote areas such as Alaska.
Accurate documentation of whale-vessel collisions is difficult
for several reasons, ranging from cases where vessel operators
are unaware that collisions should be reported, or operators
who do not report for fear of reprisal, to incomplete
data gathering on the details surrounding the collision and
difficulties inherent in accurately assessing a free-ranging
whale’s condition following a collision. In addition, a large
ship may strike a whale and the crew may be unaware that the
collision occurred. Determining that a stranded whale died
from a collision is especially difficult in Alaska because of
the logistical challenges of performing complete necropsies
(e.g., [1]) on stranded animals. These challenges include
the remote location of most carcasses, frequent inclement
weather, large tides, concerns for human safety when bears
are present, limited daylight at some times of the year, and a
lack of personnel trained in identifying ship strike injuries.
An overarching challenge in accurately estimating the
rate of ship strikes not only in Alaska, but globally, is that
there are no universal, standardized criteria for evaluating
eyewitness collision reports or stranded whales to determine
which cases represent bona fide collisions and which reports
should be rejected due to a lack of certainty. Other investi-
gators have compiled accounts of ship strikes regionally and
worldwide using variable criteria, terminology, and types of
evidence [2–20].
Informed management of whale stocks relies upon
accurate estimates of the rate of serious injuries and mor-
talities from ship strikes. In the United States, the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) [21] defines a serious
injury as any injury that will likely result in mortality. The
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
is responsible for marine mammal stock assessment reports
for all species of cetaceans and all species of pinnipeds
except walrus, including an estimate of the annual human-
caused mortality and serious injury of each stock by source
(e.g., commercial fishing, ship strike, etc.). Internationally,
the International Whaling Commission (IWC) considers
the number of mortalities from ship strikes with estimates
of fisheries bycatch in developing recommendations for
large whale conservation. The need for a standardized
quality control system to validate collision reports has been
recognized by the IWC Vessel Strike Data Standardization
Group (VSDG), which formed in 2005 to examine the issue
of ship strikes with cetaceans. Since 2007, the group has been
developing a global ship strike database that aims, among
other things, to identify the level of uncertainty associated
with individual records based on strandings and eyewitness
collision accounts [22]. The IWC database classifies collision
reports into six categories (definite ship strike, probable ship
strike, possible ship strike, not a ship strike, whale initiated
collision, and rejected report); however, these categories
do not yet have standardized definitions (D. Mattila, pers.
comm.). Each report is reviewed by the VSDG, and an
incident is only classified as a “definite ship strike” if all
members are unanimous.
At the individual level, the MMPA contains a general
prohibition on the “take” of marine mammals, defined as
“to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt,
capture, or kill any marine mammal.” NOAA regulations
implementing the MMPA further describe the term “take”
to include “the negligent or intentional operation of an
aircraft or vessel, or the doing of any other negligent or
intentional act which results in disturbing or molesting
a marine mammal” [23]. In 2001, NOAA implemented
regulations in Alaska limiting approaches to humpback
whales to minimize disturbance that could adversely affect
individual animals and to manage the threat to these animals
caused by increasing vessel traffic and a growing whale
watch industry in Alaska. These regulations prohibit vessels
from approaching within 91 m (100 yards) of a humpback
whale and require vessels to operate at a “slow, safe speed”
near humpback whales [24]. This speed is not specified
beyond the definition for “safe speed” in 33 US Code 2006,
“every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed
so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid
collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the
prevailing circumstances and conditions.” In addition, since
1979, more protective regulations have existed in Glacier Bay
National Park in southeastern Alaska to reduce the risk of
humpback whale-vessel collisions and disturbance in park
waters. These regulations include limits on the number of
vessels allowed to enter Glacier Bay, a 463 m (one-quarter
nautical mile) approach limit to humpback whales, and
vessel speed and course restrictions in areas where whales
are concentrated [25]. For species other than humpback
whales, no specific regulations exist in Alaska, although vessel
operators are advised to follow a general marine mammal
viewing “Code of Conduct” which recommends remaining at
least 91 m (100 yards) from marine mammals and avoiding
excessive speeds. These guidelines are intended to prevent
mariners from accidentally harassing or injuring whales in
violation of the MMPA and US Endangered Species Act
(ESA).
Vessel strikes are a significant concern from other
perspectives as well. In Alaska, recovering whale populations
and increasing vessel traffic are creating a persistent problem.
Collisions are costly and dangerous to humans and they
can harm mariners’ reputations. From commercial whale
watching to subsistence whaling, whales are economically
and culturally valuable to Alaska residents and visitors. In
addition, one can argue that we have an ethical obligation to
address the ship strike issue. For example, in 2007 an injured
humpback whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) with a grossly
inflated tongue and deformed head was observed alive in
southeastern Alaska for three days before dying. A necropsy
revealed that the probable cause of death was blunt trauma
[26]. From an animal welfare perspective, it is our human
responsibility to learn how to mitigate our actions—in this
case, prevent collisions—such that whales are not subject to
extended periods of suffering before dying from ship strike
injuries.
Vessel traffic in Alaska overlaps with 14 whale species
known to occur in waters around the state: humpback
whale1, fin whale (Balaenoptera physalus)1, gray whale
(Eschrichtius robustus), bowhead whale (Balaena mystice-
tus)1, minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata), blue whale
(Balaenoptera musculus)1, sei whale (Balaenoptera bore-
alis)1, North Pacific right whale (Eubalaena japonica)1,
sperm whale (Physeter macrocephalus)1, beluga whale (Del-
phinapterus leucas)2, killer whale (Orcinus orca), Cuvier’s
beaked whale (Ziphius cavirostris), Stejneger’s beaked whale
(Mesoplodon stejnegeri), and Baird’s beaked whale (Berardius
bairdii) [27, 28]. Population estimates are not available for
most of these species in Alaska waters; however, most of the
baleen whale stocks are known or thought to be recovering
following the end of commercial whaling in the North Pacific
in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, stocks of humpback,
fin, bowhead, and gray whales are estimated to be increasing
at 3–7% per year [29–32]. A notable exception is the North
Pacific right whale, which remains extremely rare with a
current population estimate of 31 animals (95% CL 23–54;
[33]) and an unknown population trend [28]. The majority
of right whale detections have occurred in the southeastern
Bering Sea [33], with a smaller number of detections in the
Gulf of Alaska south of Kodiak Island [34]. On the other end
of the spectrum, a minimum of 12,000 humpback whales are
found in high densities in spring through fall in southeastern
Alaska, the eastern Aleutian Islands, along the Bering Sea
continental shelf edge and break and in the Gulf of Alaska
(primarily near the Shumagin Islands, Kodiak Island and
from the Barren Islands through Prince William Sound)
[28, 31].
The whale strike risk for various vessel types relies on a
number of factors, including the number of vessels on the
water and their geographic overlap with each whale species.
Much of the vessel traffic in Alaskan waters is highly seasonal
and concentrated in coastal areas of southeastern and south
central Alaska during the summer months, where private
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and commercial recreational vessels (e.g., charter vessels,
commercial whale watch vessels, tour boats, and cruise ships)
are prevalent. Other types of vessel traffic in Alaskan waters
are more likely to occur year-round and/or over broader
geographic areas, including both near shore and offshore
waters (e.g., commercial fishing vessels, freighters/tankers,
passenger ferries, etc.), where they may overlap with a variety
of near shore and offshore species [28]. In general, there is
less vessel traffic off western and northern Alaska compared
to other parts of the state, although these trends are already
changing with climate change-driven decreases in sea ice in
the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort seas.
Vessel speed and size appear to be important factors in
predicting whale-vessel collisions and their outcomes. For
example, the probability of a cruise ship having a close
encounter with a humpback whale increases with the speed
of the ship (especially at speeds >11.8 kn) [35], and Silber et
al. [36] demonstrated that during close encounters, reduced
ship speeds may reduce the probability of a collision. Further
evidence comes from an analysis of worldwide collision
records with large whales, in which Laist et al. [8] found
that most lethal and severe injuries involve ships traveling
14 kn or faster and ships 80 m or longer. Likewise, Vanderlaan
and Taggart [37] analyzed collision records, modeled the
probability of lethal injury to a large whale based on vessel
speed, and concluded that the chances of a lethal injury
exceed 50% at speeds higher than 11.8 kn.
The summary reported here represents the most com-
prehensive compilation of whale-vessel collision records in
Alaska that has yet been assembled [38, 39]. All records
included here were evaluated using our newly developed
standardized system for classifying collision records (wit-
nessed at sea or based on strandings) into four confidence
categories (definite strike, probable strike, possible strike and
rejected report). Our primary goals were to (1) summarize
the circumstances surrounding whale-collisions in Alaska,
(2) recommend ways to improve data collection and valida-
tion, and (3) identify measures to help reduce collision risk.
2. Methods
Our study area included all waters of Alaska. We considered
records that involved any species of cetacean within 370 km
(200 nautical miles) of Alaska except for dolphins and
porpoises. Reports of whale-vessel collisions originated from
a variety of sources, including NOAA, the US Coast Guard
(USCG), vessel owners, tour operators, the media, and
anecdotal accounts. These reports were collected opportunis-
tically by the National Park Service (NPS) and the University
of Alaska Southeast (UAS) since 1978 and systematically by
NOAA since the Alaska Marine Mammal Stranding Network
was formed in 1985 [40]. We evaluated records where the
whale species was uncertain or unknown on a case-by-case
basis. If the species was reported as uncertain but “likely”
or “probable” species X and the report was plausible given
the seasonal and geographic distribution of species X, then
we attributed the report to species X. We counted all other
reports where the species was unknown as “unidentified
species.” We rejected reports when there was insufficient
information to verify that an actual strike occurred.
To analyze seasonal occurrence in collisions, we assigned
a month to each record based on when the strike occurred
or the carcass was found. Similarly, we assigned a year to
each record based on when the strike occurred or when the
carcass was found. We assigned one record from the “late
1980s” to the year 1989. We used linear regression to examine
the trend in the number of reports over time and log-linear
regression to estimate the average annual rate of increase in
reports.
2.1. Ship Strike Confidence Categories. The reports were
based on (1) collisions witnessed at sea and (2) strandings
in which a dead whale was found with evidence of collision
injuries. We did not consider reports of whales striking
vessels after being shot or harpooned because these collisions
are atypical and including them in our analysis would
not contribute to our understanding of typical whale-vessel
collisions. We error-checked each record against all available
documentation and entered the records into a relational
database. To avoid potential duplicate reports, we did not
include sightings of live whales with visible propeller scars
unless the collision that caused the propeller injuries was
witnessed. We assigned each record to one of four confidence
categories: definite ship strike, probable ship strike, possible
ship strike, or rejected report (Table 1).
2.2. Sex and Age Class of Struck Whales. We determined the
sex of stranded whales from necropsy reports. It was not
possible to determine the sex of live animals; however, in two
cases, we knew that individually identified humpback whales
were female because we had documented them in previous
years with calves (NPS and UAS unpublished data). In one
case, we knew that an individually identified humpback
whale was male based on genetic analysis (NPS and UAS
unpublished data).
We assigned the whale in each report to one of the
following age classes: calf, juvenile, adult, or unknown. We
based most of our assessments on empirical measurements
of dead whales’ lengths using guidelines from the scientific
literature for each species [41–45]. For humpback whales,
we defined calves as <1 year old and juveniles as whales
≥1 year old but <5 years old [46]. We determined that one
dead individually identified humpback whale was an adult
based on its ≥5-year sighting history (UAS unpublished
data). We used the following guidelines to classify dead
humpback whales based on body length: calves are typically
4–4.5 m in length at birth [47, 48], grow to 7-8 m in length
by late summer [49], attain body lengths of 8–10 m at
independence [48], and reach sexual maturity (adulthood)
at approximately 12 m in length [50]. We classified an 8.2 m
humpback whale that was found dead on March 13, 2005 as
a juvenile, even though its length fell within the typical range
for calves because it was too big to be a calf based on the date
it was found. Also, anisakid nematode parasites were found
in the whale’s small intestines, indicating that it was feeding
on fish, not milk ([51]; F. Gulland, pers. comm.).
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Table 1: Ship strike confidence categories.
Confidence category Definition
Definite strike
There is evidence that a strike occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. For example:
Strike was witnessed by the vessel operator/crew or by the operator/crew of a
nearby vessel
or
Strike was not witnessed but whale has massive blunt impact trauma (defined by
disarticulated vertebrae or fractures of one or more heavy bones including skull,
mandible, scapula, vertebra or adult rib, and a focal area of severe hemorrhaging)
or
Strike was not witnessed but carcass has apparent propeller wounds1 (i.e., deep
parallel slashes or cuts into the blubber) on the dorsal aspect
or
Strike was not witnessed but carcass has propeller wounds on the ventral and/or
lateral aspect which a necropsy confirms were produced ante mortem
or
Strike was not witnessed but carcass has an amputated appendage (e.g., fluke or
flipper) which a necropsy confirms occurred ante mortem due to a sudden and
traumatic laceration (versus an entanglement injury causing a slow, ischemic loss of
the appendage)
or
Strike was not witnessed but evidence of a collision was found on the vessel (e.g.,
whale skin or tissue)
or
Whale was found on the bow of a ship
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
>Subcategory: Whale struck stationary vessel
Vessel was stationary at the time of the collision (i.e., anchored or drifting)2
Probable strike
The report is likely to be true; having more evidence for than against, but some
evidence is lacking. For example:
Vessel operator/crew or operator/crew of a nearby vessel believes that a strike
occurred but cannot confirm the strike with absolute certainty
or
Strike was not witnessed, and the whale is a calf with smaller broken bones (e.g.,
ribs) that could have been fractured by another animal rather than by a vessel
or
Strike was not witnessed and the whale shows partial evidence of a collision other
than as defined under definite strike. For example:
(i) Whale has a focal area of severe hemorrhaging but no known broken bones;
therefore, it is possible the trauma was caused by another animal rather than by a
vessel;
(ii) Carcass has propeller wounds on the ventral and/or lateral aspect; however, the
necropsy is not able to determine if they were produced ante mortem
Possible strike
The report may be true; however, a majority of evidence is lacking. For example:
Vessel operator/crew or operator/crew of a nearby vessel believes that a strike may
have occurred but there is significant uncertainty
or
Vessel operator/crew or operator/crew of a nearby vessel believes that a strike
occurred, while the vessel operator/crew or operator/crew of a nearby vessel believes
that a strike did not occur




Strike was not witnessed, and the whale shows partial evidence of a collision other
than as defined under definite or probable strike, such as damage to an appendage
or skin, but the necropsy is incomplete or there is no close examination of the
whale (e.g., whale is viewed from a distance only)
Rejected report





Lacking sufficient detail or documentation to be credible
or
Necropsy determines an alternate cause of death
1We only included whales with propeller wounds where there was evidence that the strike occurred in Alaska (i.e., the propeller wounds had to be from a
strike that was witnessed and/or the propeller wounds had to be fresh (bleeding) or assessed to be fresh by a trained observer.)
2We counted collisions involving kayaks and canoes under this subcategory unless the kayak/canoe was known to be traveling at >0 kn.
3The credibility of the eyewitness(es) was assessed on a case-by-case basis. The most credible eyewitness is someone who had “something to lose” in reporting
the collision (e.g., the captain and/or the crew of the vessel that struck the whale) because it is presumed they would not risk reporting the collision if it had
not occurred. The least credible eyewitness is a passenger on a commercial vessel (e.g., whale watch vessel, cruise ship, etc.) who reports a collision, but there
is no supporting evidence (photos, observation of wound, blood, etc.) or other eyewitnesses. In these cases, the report was rejected unless the passenger was
an experienced observer and/or additional eyewitnesses were available to corroborate the report (assessed on a case-by-case basis).
Most observations of live whales were classified as age
class unknown; however, we classified two live sightings
of humpback whales made by knowledgeable observers as
calves based on their close, consistent affiliation with an
adult whale, presumed to be the mother (after [52]; J.
Neilson, pers. obs.; commercial whale watch captain, pers.
obs.). Similarly, we classified one live sighting of a humpback
whale as a juvenile based on the animal’s very small body
size (J. Neilson, pers. obs.). We determined that three live
individually identified humpback whales were adults based
on their ≥5 year sighting histories (NPS, UAS, and Kewalo
Basin Marine Mammal Laboratory unpublished data).
2.3. Vessel Characteristics. We assigned each report to one
of the following vessel categories: private recreational, non-
motorized recreational (e.g., kayaks and canoes), commercial
recreational (e.g., charter vessels, tour boats, and commercial
whale watch vessels), cruise ship, cargo (e.g., oil tankers,
container ships, and landing craft), commercial fishing,
research, USCG cutter, state ferry, or unknown. After Laist et
al. [8], we classified vessel lengths as small (<15 m), medium
(15–79 m), large (≥80 m), or unknown. We searched the
USCG’s Port State Information Exchange (PSIX) online
database [53] and commercial vessel operator’s websites to
fill in missing vessel lengths when the vessel name was
reported.
We evaluated the vessel’s activity prior to the collision
by assigning each record to one of the following categories:
anchored or drifting with engine off, slow travel (<12 kn),
fast travel (≥12 kn), travel at unknown speed, whale watch-
ing, intentionally approaching whales (e.g., whale research),
intentionally ramming whales, commercial longline fishing
and unknown. Similarly, we evaluated the vessel’s activity
at the time of the collision by assigning each record to one
of the following categories: anchored or drifting silently,
slow travel (<12 kn), fast travel (≥12 kn), decelerating from
fast travel, decelerating from unknown speed, travel at
unknown speed, and unknown. We classified vessel speed at
the time of the collision as anchored or drifting, 1–11 kn,
≥12 kn, or unknown. Separating vessel activity into these
two components allowed us to link particular vessel behavior
with collision risk and to assess the outcome of the collision
with some knowledge of the force with which the whale was
struck.
2.4. Fate of Whales. We evaluated the fate of the whale after
the collision by assigning each report to one of the following
categories: minor injury (presumably not life threatening—
e.g., no blood reported in water), severe injury (potentially
life threatening—e.g., blood reported in water), dead, or
unknown. We described dead whales’ injuries as unknown,
blunt trauma, or sharp trauma [54, 55].
2.5. Human Toll and Property Damage from Collisions. We
assessed the human toll and/or property damage resulting
from each collision by counting the number of reports in
which passengers onboard the vessel were knocked down,
injured, or thrown into the water. To avoid double-counting
reports, passengers who were knocked down and injured
were only counted as injured. However, passengers who were
injured and thrown into the water were counted in both
categories because we were interested in the frequency of
both of these two outcomes. We also counted the number of
reports in which there was significant damage to the vessel or
the vessel sank. We defined significant damage as that which
required repairs for continued use of the vessel.
6 Journal of Marine Biology
2.6. Collision Hotspots. We used the kernel density analysis
tool in ArcGIS 10.0 (ESRI Inc., Redlands, CA, USA) to
identify potential high risk areas for whale-vessel collisions
in southeastern Alaska. Only collisions that were witnessed
at sea were included in the analysis. Dead whales where no
collision was reported (including bow-caught whales where
the collision was not witnessed), were excluded because
the location where they were found may not be the same
as the location where they were struck [8]. We set the
output raster cell size to be 100 m and the search radius
(kernel bandwidth) to be 20 km. For clarity, raster cell values
representing extremely low collision densities (<0.0025
collisions per km2) were excluded from the map. The
remaining raster cell values (range 0.0025–0.0211 collisions
per km2) were manually divided into 32 equal classes and
displayed in colors ranging from yellow (moderate collision
risk) to red (higher collision risk).
3. Results
We verified 108 and rejected 11 reports of whale-vessel
collisions in Alaska waters between 1978 and 2011. The 11
rejected reports were not included in further analyses. Most
strikes (n = 93, 86%) involved humpback whales, although
six other species were documented (Table 2, Appendix 1
in supplementary material) (Supplementary Material will
be available online at doi:10.1155/2012/106282). In eight
reports (7%) the species was uncertain; however, we assigned
seven of these records to humpback whales and one record to
a Cuvier’s beaked whale. In one report, a pair of humpback
whales, thought to be a cow and calf, were involved in a
collision but it was unknown which animal was hit; we
counted this as one strike, not two, with the sex and age class
of the struck whale unknown.
We found a significant increase in the number of reports
over time between 1978 and 2011 (regression, r2 = 0.6999,
df = 32 , P < 0.001). Most strikes (n = 98, 91%) occurred
in May through September and there were no reports from
December or January. The majority of strikes (n = 82,
76%) were reported in southeastern Alaska (Figure 1), where
the number of humpback whale collisions increased 5.8%
annually from 1978 to 2011.
Most reports (n = 86, 80%) were based on collisions
witnessed at sea, while the remaining 22 reports (20%) were
based on dead whales where no collision was reported. The
geographic location of the 22 dead whales and the dates when
they were found did not correlate with any of the witnessed
collisions; therefore, we do not believe we double-counted
any of these reports. Three of the collisions witnessed at sea
are known to have resulted in mortalities, for a total of 25
dead whales.
3.1. Ship Strike Confidence Categories. The majority of
reports (n = 89, 82%) were assessed to be definite strikes and
in 15 (17%) of these cases, a whale struck a stationary vessel.
Seventy-nine (89%) of the 89 definite strikes were based on
witnessed collisions, and 10 reports (11%) were based on
dead whales where no collision was reported. Two (22%) of
the nine probable strikes were based on witnessed collisions,
and seven reports (78%) were based on dead whales where no
collision was reported. Five (50%) of the 10 possible strikes
were based on witnessed collisions, and five reports (50%)
were based on dead whales where no collision was reported.
Two of the nine probable strikes were thoroughly inves-
tigated, but seven reports were not and may have been
upgraded to definite strikes with more complete follow-
up (e.g., complete necropsies). In one of the two probable
strikes that were witnessed, a dead humpback whale washed
ashore within 3 km of where a 190 m cruise ship transiting
at an unknown speed reported striking what they believed
to be a whale three days earlier; however, there was no
close examination of the whale [56]. Similarly, three of the
10 possible strikes were thoroughly investigated, but seven
reports were not and may have been upgraded to definite
strikes with more complete follow-up. For example, two of
the vessel operators involved in witnessed collisions were
not interviewed, and four of the five dead whales were not
necropsied or examined closely. The fifth dead whale was
necropsied; however, the necropsy did not get down to bone
to look for fractures diagnostic of a collision.
3.2. Sex and Age Class of Struck Whales. Nine of the 25
dead whales were female, nine were male, and seven were of
unknown sex (Table 3). In addition, we documented three
live individually identified humpback whales (two females
and one male) for a total, of 21 whales of known sex (10
males and 11 females).
There were 25 whales of known age involved in collisions:
seven calves, seven juveniles, and 11 adults. Five dead whales
were calves, six were juveniles, eight were adults, and six
were of unknown age (Table 3). In addition, six humpback
whales in witnessed collisions were assigned to age classes
(two calves, one juvenile, and three adults). Six adult female
humpback whales are known to have died from collisions
and four of these mortalities occurred in southeastern Alaska
between 2001 and 2011.
3.3. Vessel Characteristics
3.3.1. Vessel Type. In 19 cases, the type of vessel involved
in the collision was unknown (18 were dead whales where
no collision was reported, but one was a witnessed collision
where the type of vessel was not recorded.) In the 89 cases
where the vessel type was known, 35% (n = 31) were private
recreational, 35% (n = 31) were commercial recreational,
8% (n = 7) were cruise ships, 7% (n = 6) were commercial
fishing vessels, 4% (n = 4) were USCG cutters, 3% (n = 3)
were cargo, 3% (n = 3) were nonmotorized recreational, 3%
(n = 3) were research, and 1% (n = 1) was a state ferry.
The three cargo vessels were a 254-m oil tanker, a 216-m
container ship, and a 10-m landing craft. The seven cases
where the vessel type was known and the whale died involved
large cruise ships (n = 5) or cargo vessels (n = 2; one
container ship and one oil tanker). All three non-motorized
recreational vessel strikes occurred in Glacier Bay.
3.3.2. Vessel Length. In 44 reports (41%) vessel length was
not reported; however, in 18 of these cases we were able to
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Table 2: Summary of whale-vessel collisions reported in Alaska 1978–2011. Rejected reports are not included.
Species
Confidence category
Total Number of known dead
Definite strike Probable strike Possible strike
Humpback whale 78 8 7 93 (86.1%) 17
Fin whale 3 3 (2.8%) 2
Gray whale 1 1 (0.9%) 1
Sperm whale 1 1 (0.9%)
Cuvier’s beaked whale 1 1 2 (1.9%) 2
Stejneger’s beaked whale 1 1 (0.9%) 1
Beluga whale 1 1 (0.9%) 1
Unidentified whale 6 6 (5.6%) 1
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Figure 1: Location of whale-vessel collision reports in Alaska by species 1978–2011 (n = 108). Rejected reports are not included.
infer the vessel’s length category based on the vessel type (n =
4, e.g., kayak and Zodiac) or look up the vessel length online
using the vessel’s name (n = 14). This left 26 reports where
vessel length was unknown. Eighteen of these cases were dead
whales where no collision was reported; however, eight were
witnessed collisions, of which five were reported to and/or
investigated by federal law enforcement officials.
In the 82 reports where vessel length was known (range
5–294 m), small (<15 m) vessels were the most commonly
reported (n = 49, 60%), followed by medium (15–79 m)
vessels (n = 22, 27%), and large (≥80 m) vessels (n = 11,
13%). The difference in the number of reports in each vessel
length category is significant (chi-square test for goodness of
fit, χ2 = 27.976, df = 2, P < 0.001).
8 Journal of Marine Biology
Table 3: Sex and age classes of the 25 whales known to have been killed by vessels.
Male Female Sex unknown
Species Calf Juvenile Adult Calf Juvenile Adult Adult Age class unknown Total
Humpback whale 4 2 1 1 6 3 17
Fin whale 1 1 2
Gray whale 1 1
Sperm whale
Cuvier’s beaked whale 1 1 2
Stejneger’s beaked whale 1 1
Beluga whale 1 1
Unidentified whale 1 1
Total 4 4 1 1 2 6 1 6 25
3.3.3. Vessel Activity Prior to Collision. In 18 reports (17%)
the vessel’s activity prior to the collision was unknown or
not reported. In the 90 reports where the vessel’s activity
was known, 44% (n = 40) were engaged in fast travel, 16%
(n = 14) were anchored or drifting silently, 14% (n = 13)
were engaged in slow travel, 12% (n = 11) were trave-
ling at an unknown speed, 7% (n = 6) were whale watching,
3% (n = 3) were intentionally approaching whales, 2%
(n = 2) were intentionally ramming whales, and 1% (n = 1)
were commercial fishing. Note that whale watching vessels
that were traveling prior to the collision were classified
under one of the traveling vessel activity categories. The
difference in the number of reports in each vessel activity
category is significant (chi-square test for goodness of fit,
χ2 = 99.867, df = 7, P < 0.001).
3.3.4. Vessel Activity at Time of Collision. In 19 reports (18%)
the vessel’s activity at the time of the collision was unknown
or not reported. In the 89 reports where the vessel’s activity
was known, 33 (37%) were engaged in fast travel, 19 (21%)
were engaged in slow travel, 15 (17%) were anchored or
drifting silently, 12 (13%) were traveling at an unknown
speed, 9 (10%) were decelerating from fast travel, and one
(1%) was decelerating from slow travel. The 10 vessels that
reported decelerating did so in response to seeing the whale
just prior to the collision, thus in some cases, their speed
at the time of the collision (below) is lower (i.e., 1–11 kn
versus ≥12 kn). The difference in the number of reports in
each vessel activity category is significant (chi-square test
for goodness of fit, χ2 = 39.157, df = 5, P < 0.001).
All 15 of the cases where a whale struck a stationary vessel
involved humpback whales hitting vessels that were anchored
or drifting with their engine off.
3.3.5. Vessel Speed at Time of Collision. In 47 reports (44%)
vessel speed at the time of the collision was unknown or
not reported; however, in 14 of these cases we were able
to infer the vessel’s speed based on other information in
the report (e.g., “sailboat under power” was classified as 1–
11 kn). This resulted in 75 reports (69%) where vessel speed
was known (range 0–35 kn), with vessels, traveling at ≥12 kn
the most commonly reported (n = 37, 49%), followed by
vessels traveling at 1–11 kn (n = 23, 31%), and anchored or
drifting vessels (n = 15, 20%). The difference in the number
of reports in each vessel speed category is significant (chi-
square test for goodness of fit, χ2 = 9.92, df = 2, P < 0.05).
Twenty-two of the 33 cases (67%) where vessel speed was
unknown were dead whales where no collision was reported;
however, 11 (33%) were witnessed collisions in which speed
was not recorded. The maximum speed reported (35 kn) was
a 10 m jet boat whose operator intentionally rammed a pair
of humpback whales thought to be a cow and calf [57].
3.4. Fate of Whales. In most cases (n = 78, 72%), the fate
of the whale following the collision was unknown, but 25
cases (23%) were known mortalities, and in five cases (5%)
the whale was documented alive in subsequent months or
years using individual identification techniques (NPS and
UAS unpublished data).
3.4.1. Minor Injuries. In 11 cases (10%) the whale was
observed with either a presumably minor injury or no visible
injuries (all were humpback whales). Five of these whales
are known to have survived; however, the fate of the other
six whales is unknown. The five surviving whales (one calf,
three adults, and one age unknown) were hit by vessels <20 m
in length (range 7–19.8 m) traveling at 5 kn (n = 1), 10 kn
(n = 2), 25 kn (n = 1), and an unknown speed (n = 1).
The latter vessel was whale watching and was therefore likely
traveling at 1–11 kn. Three of the whales had blunt trauma
injuries after being struck by the bows of vessels and two
had sharp trauma injuries from propellers. The collision that
occurred at 25 kn was reported in 2008 by the captain of a
10 m aluminium tour boat after he struck a humpback whale
as the whale came up to breathe [58]. The captain believed
that the whale he hit was an individual with a uniquely
marked dorsal fin that was well known to tour boat captains
in the area. The speed of the vessel decreased approximately
3-4 kn after the strike, and he did not see the whale come
up again, but it is unknown how long the vessel stayed on
scene. Later that day, this uniquely marked adult whale was
documented behaving normally and lunge feeding nearby
(NOAA unpublished data), and it was observed as recently
as 2011 with no visible injuries (NPS unpublished data). The
calf that was struck was documented alive with its mother
75 days after being hit by an 18 m commercial fishing vessel
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transiting at 10 kn (NOAA unpublished data). The other
three whales that are known to have survived have been
documented for a minimum of six years post-collision (NPS
unpublished data).
3.4.2. Severe Injuries. In five cases (5%) the whale was
observed after the collision with a severe injury (three hump-
back whales and two unidentified large whales); however, the
fate of these whales is unknown. In four of these cases, blood
was reported in the water. Three of these whales had sharp
trauma injuries from propellers, while the type of injury
sustained by the fourth whale was unknown. In the fifth case,
a humpback whale punched a 1.5 m hole through the hull
of an anchored 22 m wooden sailboat, sinking the vessel and
leaving six plates of baleen measuring approximately 0.3 m in
length held together by torn flesh inside the splintered hull.
3.4.3. Mortalities. In 25 cases (23%) the whale is known to
have died, but vessel length and speed were known in only
three of these cases. Two of the 86 collisions witnessed at sea
that are known to have caused mortalities (both were adult
humpback whales) involved 232 m and 243 m cruise ships
traveling 14 kn and 19 kn, respectively. In a third case, a dead
humpback whale was found on the bow of a 216 m container
ship, and the vessel’s speed at the time of the collision is
unknown; however, its typical transit speed was 12–19 kn.
Statewide, humpback whale vessel-strike mortalities peaked
in 2010 (n = 4) and we found an increasing trend in the
number of humpback whales killed between 1978 and 2011
(regression, r2 = 0.1193, df = 32 , P < 0.05).
Thirteen (52%) of the 25 dead whales were first reported
floating: five were towed to shore for examination, five are
known to have washed ashore on their own, and three
were not towed and floated away. Seven (28%) of the dead
whales were first reported beach-cast. Five of the dead whales
(20%) were caught on the bulbous bows of large ships (three
humpback whales, one fin whale and one unidentified large
baleen whale in 2009 that appeared to be a fin, blue, or sei
whale). One of the humpback whales slipped off a 243 m
cruise ship’s bow and sank when the ship slowed down,
the other four bow-caught whales remained pinned to the
ships’ bows (288 m cruise ship, 294 m cruise ship, 254 m oil
tanker, and 216 m container ship) until they came into port
or stopped. The state of decomposition and point of collision
impact on two of the whales is unknown. However, the fin
whale and two of the humpback whale carcasses were fresh
(not bloated) and appeared to have been struck on the dorsal
side of their bodies, indicating that the whales were alive
when they were hit [9, 54]. This is inferred because most large
whales (except right and bowhead whales) sink when they die
and then rise to the surface, ventral side up, as decomposition
gases inflate the abdomen (assuming the abdominal cavity
is intact and the carcass is in relatively shallow water) [18,
59, 60]. Depending on blubber thickness, some whales may
float immediately upon death; in these cases, they typically
will float ventral side up within approximately 24 hours as
decomposition gases inflate the abdomen (F. Gulland, pers.
comm.). Therefore, collision injuries on the dorsal side of a
Table 4: Types of injuries sustained by the 25 whales known to have








Humpback whale 12 2 3
Fin whale 2
Cuvier’s beaked whale 1 1




Total 16 (64%) 5 (20%) 4 (16%)
whale provide indirect evidence that the whale was alive (or
extremely recently dead) when it was struck, otherwise the
point of collision impact would be expected on the whale’s
ventral or lateral side ([54], F. Gulland, pers. comm.).
The first whale necropsy conducted in Alaska with a
veterinarian trained in assessing ship strike injuries occurred
in 2001. Since then, numerous veterinarians, stranding team
members and other personnel have gained experience in
assessing ship strike injuries and 13 more necropsies have
found evidence that whales died from collisions. However,
six of these necropsies were incomplete, meaning that the
carcass was not flensed down to the bone to look for
fractures. In several cases, the necropsy team ran out of
time as the incoming tide covered the carcass. Overall, 11
humpback whales, two fin whales, and one Cuvier’s beaked
whale with ship strike injuries have been necropsied since
2001.
Most of the 25 dead whales (n = 16, 64%) had blunt
trauma injuries, five (20%) had sharp trauma injuries, and
four (16%) had unknown injuries because they were not
necropsied (Table 4); however, at least three (two humpback
whales and one unidentified large baleen whale that appeared
to be a fin, blue, or sei whale) likely suffered from blunt
trauma because they were found pinned to ships’ bows. The
fourth whale stranded in 1978 after a cruise ship reported
striking what they believed to be a whale; however, there
was no close examination of this humpback whale, and it is
unknown if the ship’s bow or propeller(s) struck the whale.
The necropsy of an adult female humpback whale found
on the bow of a 288 m cruise ship in 2010 revealed a poten-
tially complicated history [61]. A necropsy was conducted,
and both gross and internal assessments of the carcass were
made; however, the necropsy was limited by an incoming
tide. Though it was not possible to strip the carcass entirely
to the bone, the animal was found to have a sharp trauma
injury (amputated pectoral flipper cut cleanly at 0.8 m in
diameter), acute degenerative myopathy in several muscle
tissues (indicating severe ante mortem stress and muscle
exertion), and a large area of missing inframandibular tissue,
indicating that the whale may have been fed on by killer
whales. Elevated saxitoxin levels were also detected, which
could have caused the whale to behave abnormally, making
it more vulnerable to being struck. It has been proposed
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that the whale may have been struck initially by a different
large vessel, shearing off the pectoral fin and causing debility
and/or death, followed by possible predation by killer whales,
and eventual postmortem entrapment on the bow of the
cruise ship. However, in initial photos of the carcass on the
ship’s bow, the whale does not appear to be bloated and the
point of collision impact is on the dorsal thorax, indicating
that the whale may have been alive when it was struck. We
include the details of this particular report to illustrate the
complexities involved in piecing together case histories and
determining cause of death.
3.5. Human Toll and Property Damage from Collisions.
In 37 reports (34%) the passengers and vessel were not
affected by the collision, in 36 reports (33%) there was
some kind of human toll and/or property damage resulting
from the collision, and in 35 reports (32%) the outcome
of the collision for the passengers and vessel is unknown.
There were 19 reports in which passengers were knocked
down (affecting a minimum of 41 people), 10 reports in
which passengers were injured (affecting a minimum of 18
people), 9 reports in which passengers were thrown into
the water (affecting a minimum of 15 people), 20 reports
of significant property damage, and three reports of private
recreational vessels sinking. Two of the vessels that sank
(a 10 m fiberglass sailboat and a 22 m wooden sailboat)
were anchored or drifting with their engine off when they
were rammed by humpback whales. The third case involved
a 8 m polyethylene powerboat that sank after striking an
unidentified large whale while transiting at 19 kn.
3.6. Collision Hotspots. We identified several high risk areas
for whale-vessel collisions in southeastern Alaska (Figure 2).
All of the high risk areas were located in the northern portion
of southeastern Alaska. The areas with the highest collision
densities centered around Point Adolphus in Icy Strait and
around North Pass in lower Lynn Canal, both popular whale
watching destinations. Medium-risk areas centered around
the Inian Islands in Cross Sound and in Sitka Sound. Other
areas where we identified a collision risk included eastern
Icy Strait near Hoonah, the lower West Arm of Glacier Bay,
upper Stephens Passage, and eastern Frederick Sound.
4. Discussion
The great majority of ship strikes in Alaska occur with hump-
back whales in southeastern Alaska. This area is primarily
comprised of protected waters and supports a genetically dis-
tinct feeding aggregation of 3,000–5,000 humpback whales
[31]. The number of humpback whale collisions detected
in this region increased by 5.8% annually from 1978 to
2011, which closely matches the 6.8% annual growth rate
of the humpback whale population in southeastern Alaska
between 1986 and 2008 [62]. Although the problem at
present may not be resulting in population level impacts, a
collision with a large whale is considered a “take” under the
MMPA and is therefore a cause for concern, as are other
considerations such as human safety. Our results showing
an increase over time in whale and vessel collisions are
susceptible to several biases inherent in the dataset, yet we
believe that this conclusion is valid based on the seasonal
overlap of high densities of humpback whales and vessels
and an increasing whale population trend in southeastern
Alaska.
4.1. Reporting Biases. Although we attempted to capture
all whale-vessel collisions throughout Alaska, the number
we report here represents a minimum level of occurrence
due to under-reporting of witnessed collisions and the
significant challenges involved in investigating cause of death
in whale mortalities in a large and remote state. We know
that under-reporting of witnessed collisions occurs; for
example, a survey of recreational boaters in southeastern
Alaska documented that at least three out of four whale-
vessel collisions in this region were not reported (J. Straley,
pers. comm.), and similar rates of under-reporting have
been found among professional mariners in Hawaii [63].
This lack of reporting could be due to fear of possible
repercussions or simple ignorance that collisions should be
reported to NOAA. In 2009, NOAA implemented a toll-
free Marine Mammal Stranding Hotline in Alaska, which
increased public awareness about the existence of a stranding
network and the agency’s interest in collecting ship strike
information and may have led to an increase in reports in
recent years. One only has to engage in casual conversation
with nearly any Alaskan boater to hear anecdotal stories of
whale strikes that happened to them or someone they know.
Most of these reports lack so many critical details such as
vessel speed, location, and the fate of whale that although
they would contribute to a better understanding of the true
frequency of whale-vessel collisions, they might not advance
our knowledge of the specific factors leading to collisions or
their outcomes.
We documented collisions with seven of the 14 whale
species known to occur in Alaska, with 86% of the reports
involving humpback whales and none involving bowhead,
minke, blue, sei, North Pacific right, Baird’s beaked, or killer
whales. We recognize that the records compiled here may be
biased towards humpback whales because the authors are
based in southeastern Alaska; however, the overwhelming
number of live and dead reports involving humpback whales
indicates that they are the most heavily impacted species, at
least in terms of absolute numbers. The seasonal trend in
collisions, with 91% of reports occurring in May through
September, is not surprising because these are the months
when humpback whales, which migrate in winter to lower
latitudes, are most common in Alaska. The number of hump-
back whales that are known to have died from collisions
in Alaska (n = 17) is much higher than in Washington
from 1980–2006 (n = 1) [18] or British Columbia from
1995–2007 (n = 0) [64], despite both areas being important
summer habitat for this species. The reason for this difference
is unknown, but Douglas et al. [18] were surprised by the
virtual absence of dead ship-struck humpback whales in
Washington.
When a dead whale is reported in Alaska, there are
limited resources and personnel to respond and conduct a



































































































Figure 2: Whale-vessel collision hotspots in southeastern Alaska based on kernel density estimation. Yellow indicates moderate collision risk
and red indicates higher collision risk. The locations of the collision reports used to create the map are displayed.
necropsy. Whether a necropsy is pursued or not depends on
a variety of factors, including the condition of the carcass
(ranging from fresh to skeletal), location and accessibility,
safety, weather, available expertise, and whether the carcass
is secured (such that it will not be washed away by the tide
before a team can respond). Priority may be given to species
listed under the ESA, species which are rarely encountered or
for which little data exists (i.e., beaked whales), or incidents
where there is a likelihood of human interaction (e.g.,
suspected ship strike, entanglement, shooting, etc.).
We were surprised to find so few collisions with fin
whales (n = 3) given their abundance and widespread dis-
tribution in many parts of Alaska [28], especially compared
to other studies, which have found them to be the most com-
mon species struck by vessels [8, 9, 18]. One reason so few fin
whale collisions were observed is that fin whales are rare in
the inside waters of southeastern Alaska frequented by vessels
and occur more commonly offshore where a dead whale is
less likely to be noticed. Collisions with gray whales (n = 1),
sperm whales (n = 1), and killer whales (n = 0) were also
rare compared to trends documented elsewhere [8, 18, 64].
Although vessel collisions with beaked whales have been
documented in other areas [15, 17, 65], we were surprised to
find three fatal strikes involving two Cuvier’s beaked whales
and one Stejneger’s beaked whale because these species are
observed rarely and typically inhabit offshore waters [27, 28].
We acknowledge several geographic biases in the records
we compiled. The records are likely biased towards southeast-
ern Alaska and there is a statewide bias towards human popu-
lation centers (e.g., Juneau, Anchorage, Seward, and Kodiak)
where there are more observers on the water. However, this
goes hand-in-hand with more vessels on the water, so these
areas probably do have a higher collision risk. Our dataset,
like other ship strike datasets [9], is biased towards species
that inhabit near shore waters, such as humpback whales,
because carcasses of near shore species are more likely to be
found (and subsequently examined) compared to offshore
species. Furthermore, carcasses reported floating far offshore
are unlikely candidates for towing to shore for necropsies
given the long distances involved. In addition, whales that
die offshore in water depths greater than 1,000 m may not
float to the surface because the hydrostatic pressure at these
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depths limits the generation of buoyant decomposition gases
[60]. There is generally more vessel traffic in near shore
areas compared to offshore areas, which likely puts near
shore species at a higher risk for collisions. We propose
that a better understanding of the geographic extent of
ship strikes in Alaska could be obtained by an effort to
actively solicit information about past events from resource
managers, law enforcement officers, the media, and the
maritime community throughout the state. Maintaining
NOAA’s current focus on systematic data collection about
ship strikes as they occur will also help facilitate equal
representation of all parts of Alaska.
4.2. Ship Strike Confidence Categories. We recommend that
the standardized system we developed to classify collision
records into four confidence categories (definite strike,
probable strike, possible strike, and rejected report), or a
similar detailed system, be universally adopted to reduce
uncertainty in interpreting ship strike data. Other investiga-
tors have employed similar tiered classification systems for
dead whales with evidence of ship strike injuries (e.g., [10, 13,
15, 16, 18]); however, our definitions contain a higher level
of detail which we feel makes our approach more useful as a
classification tool. Also, unlike other classification systems,
ours includes criteria for classifying eyewitness collision
reports. We recognize that our definitions err on the side of
classifying strikes as definite when it is possible that some of
these collisions occurred postmortem; however, we surmise
that postmortem strikes of large whales are unlikely and
consequently rare, given that floating carcasses are, in most
cases, significantly bloated and therefore highly visible to the
naked eye and radar ([15]; F. Gulland, pers. comm.). To rule
out misclassifying postmortem collisions, we recommend
that whenever possible, samples from stranded whales be
collected and analyzed using histochemical techniques that
can detect fat emboli diagnostic of ante mortem bone
fractures and severe soft-tissue damage [66, 67].
We acknowledge that including possible and probable
strikes in our analyses positively biased the number of
ship strike records; however, like Van Waerebeek et al.
[15], we chose to include these reports in our analysis
because (a) we are trying to quantify a problem that we
know is under-reported and (b) we feel that the confidence
codes are generally conservative, meaning that the majority
of the probable and possible strikes are likely to have
been genuine collisions but incomplete followup and/or
necropsies precluded classifying many of them as definite
strikes.
Along with a standardized system to evaluate the level
of certainty associated with individual collision reports, we
also recommend that a universal standardized reporting
form for collisions witnessed at sea would improve the
quality of ship strike data by reducing the number of reports
lacking key information such as vessel size and speed at the
time of the collision. An outreach campaign to the public
and to the resource protection agency personnel likely to
respond to reported collisions will help ensure systematic
reporting of the salient details of collisions. Currently, the
NOAA National Marine Mammal Stranding Database does
not accept ship strike records, thus recording and cataloguing
methods vary among NOAA regions across the country.
Regions typically record collision reports on a general marine
mammal stranding reporting form rather than using a
specialized ship strike reporting form that prompts for key
details. The latter approach is needed both nationally and
internationally to ensure more systematic documentation of
collisions and their outcomes.
4.3. Sex and Age Class of Struck Whales. We did not detect any
difference in the collision risk for male versus female whales,
but did find that calves and juveniles appear to be at higher
risk of collisions than adult whales, which is consistent with
other studies [3, 7, 8, 13, 14, 17, 18]. Our age class data are
biased towards dead whales; therefore, it is unknown if young
animals are overall more likely than adults to be struck (based
on differences in their behavior, sightability, or other factors).
It is also plausible that young animals are more likely to die
from collisions because of their smaller body size.
4.4. Vessel Characteristics. All types and sizes of vessels
collided with whales; however, small (<15 m) recreational
vessels were the most common. This result contrasts with
other studies that have concluded that small vessels are less
likely than larger vessels to strike whales [8]. We found
more private recreational vessel strikes and fewer commercial
recreational vessel strikes than in Hawaii, where the majority
of recorded collisions with humpback whales involved
commercial whale watch vessels [14], but this result might
be biased by different numbers of private versus commercial
whale watch vessels in the two areas. The number of large
vessels that we documented is presumably an underestimate
because compared to smaller vessels, the crews of large
vessels may be less likely to see collisions when they occur
due to limited visibility around their bows, and the impact
of a collision is less likely to be felt in larger vessels [8].
Undetected collisions with large vessels presumably account
for some of the 22 cases where dead whales were found but
no collision was reported. Alternatively, these collisions may
have been witnessed but not reported. We recognize that
the majority of records were based on witnessed collisions
and that our conclusions regarding the types of vessels that
hit whales are likely to be biased by different reporting and
detection rates between vessel types. For example, some user
groups may be more wary of reporting collisions to federal
officials, and overall some user groups are more aware than
others that collisions should be reported. For instance, in
recent years, there has been a high level of awareness in the
Alaska cruise ship industry about whale collision avoidance
and reporting, but other user groups may not be as aware of
the issue, leading to under-reporting.
It is notable that all 15 stationary vessels that were struck
by humpback whales were drifting with their engine off or
anchored. This suggests that the whales did not detect the
vessels and that being in a silent vessel may increase the
risk of a collision. Further evidence comes from a study of
sailing vessel collisions with cetaceans, which found that 79%
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of collisions occurred when the vessels were under sail, as
opposed to motoring [19]. Many boaters erroneously assume
that whales are aware of their presence and location at all
times. Increasing public outreach and education programs
that emphasize that sperm whales are the only large whale
species that uses echolocation could be beneficial in reducing
collision risk.
4.5. Fate of Whales. Our data support previous findings
that collisions are more likely to be lethal when they
involve large ships and higher vessel speeds [8, 37]. In the
three mortalities where both vessel length and speed were
known, the ships ranged from 216–243 m in length and were
traveling 12–19 kn. Four other mortalities involved 190–
294 m ships traveling at unknown speeds. In addition to
these seven mortalities, there were eight more dead whales
whose massive injuries (e.g., fractured skulls) indicate that
they were likely struck by large ships in collisions that
were either not detected or witnessed but not reported.
Conversely, four of the five cases in which struck humpback
whales were known to have survived provide evidence that
collisions with smaller, slower moving vessels are less likely
to inflict serious or fatal injuries [8, 37]. We know of at
least 23 other humpback whales in southeastern Alaska
that have survived collisions based on live sightings of 15
different whales with healed propeller wounds and eight
whales with deep gashes and other wounds that appear to be
from vessel collisions (NPS, UAS, NOAA, and Alaska Whale
Foundation unpublished data). The vessel types, sizes, and
speeds involved in these nonfatal collisions are unknown, but
all of the propeller wounds appear to be from relatively small
vessels based on the size and close spacing of the propeller
scars.
The majority (80%) of the collision records were based
on strikes witnessed at sea, with the fate of the whale
unknown in most (72%) cases. However, over half (49%)
of the witnessed collisions occurred at vessel speeds ≥12 kn,
and therefore some of these collisions may have been fatal,
though the smaller size of most of the vessels presumably
means that lethal collisions were less likely [8, 37]. We found
that vessel operators are often exceeding a “slow, safe speed”
near humpback whales as required in Alaska [24] and that
overall, vessels engaged in fast travel are at a greater risk of
striking a whale. In the majority of cases, the collisions were
accidental, with little or no time for evasive action. In a few
cases (n = 10), vessel operators reported decelerating just
prior to hitting the whale.
4.5.1. Mortalities. We found blunt trauma injuries (e.g.,
broken bones and a focal area of hemorrhaging) to be more
than three times as common as sharp trauma injuries (e.g.,
propeller wounds) in whales that died from ship strikes in
Alaska, whereas propeller injuries dominate among dead
ship struck right whales along the US Atlantic and South
African coasts [8] and gray whales in Washington [18]. Blunt
trauma injuries were prevalent in ship struck balaenopterids
examined in Washington [18] and in ship struck fin, blue,
and sei whales along the US Atlantic and French coasts
[8]. Models indicate that whales at the water’s surface are
more likely to be hit by the bows of ships than whales
submerged near the surface, which are more likely to suffer
propeller strikes [36]. The majority (12 of 16) of the blunt
trauma injuries in our sample were sustained by humpback
whales. Humpback whales in Alaska typically make short,
shallow dives [68] and spend a relatively high proportion
of their time feeding, socializing, and resting at the surface
(NPS unpublished data). This behavior pattern may make
humpbacks more susceptible to bow strikes than propeller
strikes, explaining why we found more blunt trauma injuries
than sharp trauma injuries. In contrast, North Atlantic right
whales spend the majority of their time submerged 0.5–2.5 m
below the water’s surface, which may explain why vessel
collisions in general, and propeller injuries in particular, are
so common in this species [69]. Douglas et al. [18] proposed
two other possible explanations for the greater percentage
of blunt traumas found in some species: (1) deep propeller
wounds may open the body cavity and make the whale more
likely to sink and not be recovered; (2) bow-caught whales
(i.e., blunt trauma cases) are more likely to be transported
to coastal waters where they can be recovered and examined.
Both of these hypotheses may apply to our observations, but
neither fully explains our findings. Note that in our dataset,
15 of the 16 whales with blunt trauma injuries were found
floating or beach-cast, not bow-caught. However, some of
these whales may have been bow-caught originally but then
slipped off after the ships slowed down or stopped. Ships
displacing 1600 or more gross tons are required to test their
forward/astern propulsion within 12 hours of entering or
getting underway in US waters [70], which could increase
the chances of a bow-caught whale slipping off before it is
detected.
A total of five dead whales were reported caught on the
bulbous bows of large ships (three humpback whales, one fin
whale, and one unidentified large baleen whale that appeared
to be a fin, blue, or sei whale). Previously, stocky whale
species such as humpback whales were not thought to be
susceptible to being pinned to the bows of ships compared
to longer, sleeker rorquals such as fin whales [8]. This
conclusion was based on a single known case from Alaska
of a humpback whale draped over a cruise ship’s bulbous
bow, and this whale slipped off the bow and sank when the
ship slowed down [8, 71]. A second case, reported to have
occurred in Alaska in 2006 and cited by Van Waerebeek et
al. [15], was misidentified in the media as a bow-caught
humpback whale, but this was actually a fin whale [72].
In addition to the single bow-caught humpback whale case
already reported in Laist et al. [8], we documented two new
verified cases in which humpback whales were caught on
the bows of ships. In both cases, the whales did not slip off
when the ships stopped; in fact, in one case, it was difficult to
dislodge the whale from the bow [61].
The 25 whales that we concluded had died from ship
strikes from 1978–2011 represent the minimal number
of whale mortalities from ship strikes in Alaska during
this time period. Over the same time span, 516 large
whales (i.e., baleen whales and sperm whales) were reported
dead in Alaska (NOAA Alaska Region Stranding Database
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unpublished data). Thirty-two (6%) of these carcasses were
necropsied, with 13 of the whales classified as ship strikes in
this study. Excluding two bow-caught whales (because they
are not representative of the typical floating or beach-cast
dead whale), 37% (11 of 30) of the large whales necropsied
in Alaska since 1978 have died from ship strikes. Similar high
rates of ship strike mortalities have been found along the U.S.
East Coast in some whale species (e.g., one-third of stranded
northern right whales and fin whales) [8]. It is unknown
how many more dead sank whales in Alaska were scavenged,
floated offshore, and/or sunk without being located, but
considering the remoteness of the state’s coastline and
offshore areas, 516 dead whales presumably represents a
small fraction of the true number of dead whales over this
34-year period. Studies in the Gulf of Mexico suggest that on
average, only 2% (range 0–6.2%) of cetacean carcasses are
recovered [73], and low detection rates (range <1%–17%)
have also been documented in several other cetacean species
in other areas [74–77]. The high rate of ship strike mortalities
in Alaska, as indicated by the available necropsy data (37%),
suggests that many ship strike mortalities are likely going
undetected in floating and beach-cast whales that are not
examined.
In recent years, there has been improvement in the
investigation of cause of death in whale stranding mortalities
in Alaska, due to increased resources and expertise within
the state, from sources such as the Prescott Marine Mammal
Stranding Grant Program, the Alaska SeaLife Center, and
additional veterinary support within the Alaska Marine
Mammal Stranding Network. These improvements may
explain some of the apparent increase in humpback whale
ship strike mortalities over time. For example, 72% (24
of 32) of the large whale necropsies conducted in Alaska
since 1978 occurred between 2001 and 2011 (NOAA Alaska
Region Stranding Database unpublished data), which reflects
NOAA’s increased commitment to necropsy whales over the
past decade. Despite these improvements, limited resources
and personnel, combined with the logistical challenges of
responding to remote carcasses, continue to result in missed
opportunities to investigate the cause of death in many
whale strandings. While federal resource agencies in Alaska
strive to promote and facilitate necropsies led by experienced
teams, ideally veterinarians, to investigate cases of whale
mortality, additional resources are recommended to increase
capacity and infrastructure in necropsy response to improve
cause of death investigations. For instance, establishing a
statewide network of vessels that are available to tow floating
whale carcasses to shore would reduce the number of
missed opportunities for necropsies. In many cases, multiday
necropsies may be needed to flense a carcass down to bone
to examine the skeleton for fractures, especially because
necropsy sites in Alaska are generally too remote for heavy
equipment to assist with maneuvering large carcasses [1].
It may be beneficial to involve northern Alaska Eskimo
subsistence whalers, who are highly skilled in flensing whales
without the aid of machines, in large whale necropsy teams.
Alternatively, returning to inspect carcasses over time to look
for newly exposed broken bones may be helpful, although
postmortem damage to bones on weather-beaten shores
may confuse matters. Responding to whale strandings in
Alaska will always be more challenging than in less remote
areas where necropsy rates may be as high as 69% [18],
but continuing to increase efforts to perform complete
necropsies (e.g., down to bone to examine for fractures,
Table 1) using experienced teams focused on determining
cause of death [1] is needed to allow for a more accurate
determination of the rate of ship strike mortality in Alaska.
Performing full necropsies on ship struck whales is also
important because they can reveal underlying factors such
as disease, biotoxins, parasites, prior injuries, and entangle-
ments in fishing gear that may have compromised a whale
and predisposed it to being hit by a vessel [8, 15]. Researchers
investigating northern sea otter (Enhydra lutris) mortalities
from vessel collisions in Alaska have found that many of the
struck otters had underlying health issues such as bacterial
infections and biotoxins that may have made them more
susceptible to being hit (V. Gill, pers. comm.). In our sample,
one adult humpback whale was found to have elevated
saxitoxin levels that may have caused it to behave abnormally,
which could have made it more vulnerable to being struck
[61]. Systematic sample collection in all necropsies to test
for an array of underlying factors is needed to gain a better
understanding of how often these other stressors may be
contributing to collisions. Recognizing that the pathology
results from necropsies are often not available for weeks
or months after the stranding, detecting the proximate
and ultimate causes of vessel strikes will require stranding
network personnel ensure that these results are systematically
entered into the main record for each stranding in such a way
that meta-analyses are possible. Storing these data in a usable
fashion may require modifications to the national stranding
database structure.
4.6. Human Toll and Property Damage from Collisions. The
discovery that one-third of collisions resulted in some kind
of human toll and/or property damage highlights that whale-
vessel collisions are a human safety issue. To date, there
have been no confirmed human fatalities from collisions in
Alaska, although in one of the reports we rejected, a 5 m skiff
reportedly struck a gray whale, and the operator died after
falling into the water [78]. The human fatality was confirmed
but we could not confirm that the accident was caused by
a collision with a whale. Threats to human safety posed by
collisions have been documented elsewhere [8, 17, 19, 79],
but the frequency of human injuries and property damage
we documented may be positively biased because presumably
these cases are more likely to be reported than other
collisions. Increased attention to systematic documentation
of human injuries and/or property damage in all collision
reports is needed to allow for a more quantitative assessment
of the problem. Regardless, the number of documented
incidents indicates that boaters in Alaska, especially those
operating small open vessels where the likelihood of being
thrown into the water from a collision is high, would benefit
from public outreach and education programs that raise
awareness of the risks posed by collisions and how these risks
can be minimized (e.g., slow down, keep a sharp lookout for
whales, always wear a life-jacket, etc.).
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4.7. Management Recommendations. As we have shown in
our analyses, the problem of whale-vessel collisions is clearly
one that can be detrimental to whales and humans. Con-
versely, avoiding whale-vessel collisions is mutually benefi-
cial, but the challenge is to understand how best to reach and
advise each user group, given the tangle of human factors that
influence vessel operators’ decisions. These factors include,
but are not limited to: economics, convenience, knowledge
and tolerance of risk, and whether they are professional or
recreational vessel operators. For the professional mariner,
the recently published International Whaling Commission
and International Maritime Organization collision avoidance
leaflet [80] gives practical advice (e.g., pay attention, avoid
areas where you know there are whales, and slow down) in
an appealing and respectful format. Available on the internet
in six languages, this leaflet also highlights the importance
of reporting collisions to foster an understanding that will
help avoid future incidents. Wide distribution of this leaflet
in the international maritime industry will highlight the
issue and create an ongoing dialog on whale avoidance in
the industry that seems likely to alleviate some collision
risk.
For recreational boaters, we suggest that the most
effective approach for raising awareness of the issue would
occur in nonregulatory settings using contemporary modes
of communication including social networking, to inform
people how to avoid collisions, and the need to report
incidents when they occur. A key message for operators of
small boats in Alaska is that the likelihood of colliding with a
whale is increasing, and that people can get hurt, costly vessel
damage can occur and the whale can be injured or killed.
Simple but specific preventive measures that encourage
vigilance and the willingness to use slow speeds in high-
density whale areas should be made widely available in
a sound-byte format that is easy to digest. Creating and
distributing these messages is a step toward creating a culture
where people understand the risks and will do what they can
to avoid collisions with whales.
Collision hotspots (Figure 2) are areas that warrant
special attention in the form of vessel speed limits, public
service announcements, increased law enforcement presence
or other measures. The map we created for this paper is
the first regional look at the geography of collisions in
Alaska, and may be a useful approach for analysis of other
collision datasets outside Alaska. High-risk areas need to
be closely examined and coupled with predictive modeling
to assess areas where conservation action (e.g., vessel speed
limits) may be targeted to prevent future vessel collisions
with whales in Alaska. For example, a recommendation to
reduce speed at night in known hotspot areas may be par-
ticularly relevant for large ships (such as cruise ships) which
routinely transit at night. Commercial vessels may want to
consider marketing “whale friendly” voyages by advertising
and adhering to lowered speeds as part of their standard
operations, along with increased care and attentiveness in
hotspot areas. Reduced speeds have been used successfully
in Glacier Bay National Park for many years (termed
“whale waters”), where the park superintendent implements
vessel course and speed restrictions in areas where whale
concentrations have been detected [25]. Protective measures
applied to relatively small areas with reliably high whale
densities may yield a disproportionately large reduction in
collision risk for humpback whales in southeastern Alaska
and presumably impact fewer vessel operators compared
to other mitigation measures [81]. As whale populations
and vessel traffic continue to change throughout the state,
improved data collection and validation of collision reports
will enhance our understanding of collisions, with the
ultimate goal of reducing the frequency of whale-vessel
collisions in Alaska.
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Endnotes
1. Listed as endangered under the ESA.
2. Listed as endangered under the ESA (Cook Inlet stock
only).
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